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A Rational Choice Model of the Book of Revelation

Department of Economics, University of St Andrews, St Salvator’s College, St Andrews, Fife, KY16 9AL

This reading applies rational choice theory to model aspects of persuasion in the book of Revelation. The apocalypse of John attempts to modify behavioural incentives such that Christian believers rationally choose faithful witness to God over compromise with pagan religion, despite the possible suffering that faithfulness may entail. This is achieved by attempting to persuade the congregations that the sum of the present costs and the expected eschatological losses from idolatry outweigh the current consumption benefits. Four incentive mechanisms are identified which operate on (1) preferences for idolatry and its psychological payoff; (2) the expected costs of faithfulness; (3) beliefs regarding the eschatological risks of idol worship; and (4) the discount rate applied to eschatological outcomes.

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